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Abstract: In contemporary debates, one is presented with temporal and 
timeless conceptions of divine eternality. Each conception is said to have 
various consequences for understanding divine perfection and 
providence. In this paper, I shall consider a pair of arguments against 
divine temporality that suggest that a temporal God could potentially 
make mistakes, thus making the temporal God less than perfect. I shall 
develop these objections, and discuss various ways for the temporalist to 
reply. 
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Within contemporary philosophical theology, one has an array of models of God 
to consider.1 Most models of God affirm that God is a necessarily existent person 
with essential properties like maximal power, maximal knowledge, maximal 
goodness, and freedom. Most models of God also affirm that God has contingent 
properties like creator and sustainer of the universe. Different models of God 
wish to affirm other, contested, essential divine properties like love, 
impassibility, omnisubjectivity, simplicity, and so on. For the purposes of this 
paper, I shall narrow my focus to one contested essential divine property: 
eternality. Very few models of God will deny that God has the property of 
eternality, but opinions differ over how to interpret this property. Eternality can 
be interpreted either as timelessness or temporality. I shall ask us to consider two 
models of God. One model of God affirms a timeless eternality, and the other 
affirms a temporal eternality. The main question to consider is which God is the 
greatest possible being. I shall examine two connected arguments from T.J. 
Mawson that seek to show that a timeless God is greater than a temporal God. 
My aim is to clarify Mawson’s arguments, and articulate different replies that are 
open to the divine temporalist.  
In section 1 of this paper, I shall articulate the two rival models of God. In 
section 2, I identify ways of testing models of God for greatness. In section 3, I 
shall articulate Mawson’s arguments for thinking that a timeless God is greater 
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than a temporal God. In section 4, I shall discuss five ways that the future can be 
open or closed. This will provide the conceptual machinery that is needed to 
develop Mawson’s arguments, and identify the different possible temporalist 
responses. In section 5, I discuss four possible replies that a temporalist can offer 
in response to Mawson’s arguments. Each reply attempts to show that timeless 
eternality does not make God greater. Each reply has its costs, but these costs 
have nothing to do with whether or not God is timeless. Thus, each reply 
provides some reason for thinking that Mawson’s arguments against temporality 
have been undermined. In section 6, I offer some concluding remarks.   
 
1. A Tale of Two Deities 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will consider two rival models of God: a timeless 
God and a temporal God. I shall start by stating what these models of God have 
in common before discussing their differences. As I shall understand it, both 
models of God are committed to the philosophical tradition of perfect being 
theology.2 Perfect being theology is a philosophical method for determining 
which properties God has essentially. Perfect being theology is only designed to 
inform a person of God’s essential properties. It is not a method designed to 
inform a person about God’s contingent or accidental properties, like being the 
creator of the universe. In order to establish God’s contingent properties, one will 
have to consider arguments from natural and revealed theology.3 For the 
purposes of this paper, I shall grant that each model of God has a way to establish 
that God is the creator and sustainer of the universe. However, my main interest 
in this paper is perfect being theology. 
Perfect being theology starts by defining God as perfect, or the greatest 
metaphysically possible being. It offers an analysis of what it means to be the 
greatest possible being, and then provides a few simple steps for discerning 
which essential properties the greatest possible being has.4 The first question for 
a perfect being theologian to ask is this. What does it mean for God to be the 
greatest metaphysically possible being? In order to answer this question, I need 
to introduce three concepts: great–making properties, extensive superiority, and 
intensive superiority.  
I shall begin with great–making properties. Yujin Nagasawa says that some 
property p is a great–making property if, all else being equal, it contributes to the 
intrinsic greatness of its possessor.5 Often times, philosophers and theologians 
state this as any property that it is intrinsically better to have than not have. A 
 
2 E.g. Rogers and Hasker (2011). 
3 Morris (1991, 28–35). 
4 Speaks (2018, 8–18). 
5 Nagasawa (2017, 53–55). 




great–making property is an intrinsic property that would improve the greatness 
of any being that has it, and it would not worsen the greatness of any being that 
possesses it.6 Perfect being theologians emphasize that great–making properties 
cannot entail any liabilities or imperfections.  
When it comes to discerning which properties God has essentially, the perfect 
being theologian will say that God has whatever properties are intrinsically 
better to have than not have. Part of the method of perfect being theology is to 
identify these great–making properties, and predicate them of God. A common 
list of great–making properties includes existence, personhood, power, knowledge, 
goodness, and freedom. However, there is more at play in the method of perfect 
being theology.  
Merely identifying a list of potential great–making properties is not enough to 
establish that God is the greatest metaphysically possible being. To be the 
greatest metaphysically possible being is to have extensive superiority and 
intensive superiority to all other possible beings.  
A being x is extensively superior to some being y if and only if x has all of the 
same great–making properties as y, and x has some great–making properties that 
y does not have.7 In the case of God, perfect being theologians say that God has 
all of the compossible great–making properties, and is thus extensively superior 
to all other possible beings.  
Extensive superiority focuses on the possession of multiple great–making 
properties, whereas intensive superiority focuses on the intensity of individual 
great–making properties. Nagasawa says that some being x is intensively 
superior to some being y if and only if x has some great–making property that y 
has, but to a greater degree of intensity than y.8 In the case of God, perfect being 
theologians claim that God has all of His degreed great–making properties to the 
maximal degree of intensity. I say “degreed properties” because some great–
making properties do not obviously come in degrees of intensity. For instance, 
properties like existence and eternality are traditionally taken to be great–making 
properties, but they do not obviously have degrees of intensity in which they can 
be possessed.  
Both models of God that I wish to consider agree on the previous account of 
divine perfection. Further, they agree that God is a necessarily existent person 
with maximal power, maximal knowledge, maximal goodness, and freedom.  
What other great–making properties do they agree on? Each model affirms 
that God is an eternal being. A being is eternal if and only if it does not begin to 
exist and does not cease to exist. If God exists of necessity, then God is an eternal 
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being.9 This is because a necessarily existent being cannot begin to exist, nor fail 
to exist. Each model affirms that God exists of necessity, thus each model affirms 
that God is an eternal being. However, Mawson points out that each model 
disagrees over how to interpret divine eternality. This is because eternality can 
be understood in two different ways: timeless or temporal.10  
To say that God is timeless is to say that God necessarily exists without 
beginning, without end, and without succession. To say that God is temporal is 
to say that God necessarily exists without beginning and without end. However, 
the divine temporalist will deny that God necessarily exists without succession. 
The temporalist will say that God must undergo succession as God freely 
exercises His power. The exercise of divine power entails a change from not 
acting to acting. Which interpretation of eternality is the great–making 
property—timeless eternality or temporal eternality? It will be difficult to answer 
that question without first addressing how one goes about discerning which 
model is the greatest.  
 
2. How to Test for Greatness?  
 
How does one discern on which model God is the greatest? In this section, I shall 
identify two sets of strategies for answering this question. The main thing that 
these strategies have in common is the demand to satisfy the definition of God as 
the greatest metaphysically possible being. These different strategies aim to show 
that a rival model of God cannot satisfy this definition of God.  
How does one argue this? There are two broad ways that one can argue this. 
First, one can try to show that a model of God cannot satisfy the metaphysically 
possible aspect of the definition of God. Call these Metaphysically Impossible 
Strategies because they aim to show that a rival model of God is metaphysically 
impossible. This can be done by showing that a model of God is internally 
incoherent, or by showing that it is not consistent with some fact about the 
world.11 For example, one might argue that a particular model of God’s 
conception of omnipotence is incoherent because it cannot handle the paradox of 
the stone. Alternatively, one might argue that a particular model of God’s 
understanding of divine freedom and simplicity are not compossible because 
simplicity entails that God cannot be free. Or perhaps one argues that a particular 
model of God is inconsistent with the existence of evil in our world. Such 
examples are fairly standard in contemporary philosophy of religion.   
The next strategies that I shall discuss focus on the greatest aspect of the 
definition of God. Call these Not the Greatest Strategies because they aim to show 
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11 Nagasawa (2013). 




that a rival model of God cannot be the greatest metaphysically possible being. 
This can be done by showing that a rival model of God is extensively inferior 
because it lacks one or more great–making properties. Perhaps one argues that 
omnisubjectivity is a great–making property, and that any model of God that 
lacks omnisubjectivity is extensively inferior to any model of God that includes 
this property. Alternatively, one can show that a rival model of God is intensively 
inferior because it does not have one or more great–making properties to the 
greatest possible degree of intensity.  
In what follows, I will consider a version of the Not the Greatest Strategy 
against divine temporality. This argument is trying to show that the temporal 
God is intensively inferior to the timeless God with regards to knowledge, power, 
and goodness.12   
  
3. Is the Timeless God Intensively Superior?  
 
In Mawson’s recent book, The Divine Attributes, he offers a version of the Not the 
Greatest Strategy that warrants a careful consideration. Mawson grants that both 
divine timelessness and divine temporality provide coherent models of God.13 
Mawson also grants that both models of God are extensively equal. However, 
Mawson argues that divine temporality makes God less great than is 
metaphysically possible. As Mawson understands it, a temporal God cannot 
infallibly know the future free choices of creatures. Without this foreknowledge, 
Mawson argues that the temporal God could potentially make mistakes that 
would render Him less powerful and less good than a timeless God who has 
infallible foreknowledge. Thus, the timeless God is intensively superior with 
regards to knowledge, power, and goodness. That is three strikes against divine 
temporality!  
I shall start with Mawson’s definitions of omniscience, omnipotence, and 
perfect goodness. Mawson’s definition of omniscience is fairly standard. God is 
essentially omniscient in that for all true propositions, God infallibly knows that 
they are true, and for all false propositions, God infallibly knows that they are 
false.14  
Mawson defines omnipotence as the most power–granting set of abilities that 
is logically possible.15 As Mawson explains, the maximal power–granting set 
does not simply contain all abilities. This is because not all abilities are powers. 
Some abilities are liabilities.16 For example, the ability to perform irrational 
 
12 Mawson (2018, 11). 
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14 Mawson (2018, 34–5). 
15 Mawson (2018, 41). 
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actions is a liability.17 Thus, this ability will not be included in the maximal 
power–granting set of abilities.  
Mawson defines perfect goodness as involving three objective moral 
dimensions: deontological, consequentialist, and virtue.18 According to Mawson, 
a perfectly good person always does what He has most objective reason to do. As 
omniscient, God will always know what He has most objective reason to do. As 
omnipotent, God will be free to perform the action that He has most objective 
reason to do.19 Further, a perfectly good God is one who’s intentions are always 
good, and who never fails to satisfy His obligations. A perfectly good God’s 
actions will give rise to the best possible consequences. In performing these good 
actions, God will instantiate virtuous character traits such as generosity, wisdom, 
and so forth.20  
With these definitions, I can now examine Mawson’s argument that divine 
temporality entails having less than maximal knowledge, power, and goodness. 
I’ll state these as two different arguments: the knowledge argument and the 
divine bodgery argument.  
 
3.1. The Knowledge Argument  
 
The details of Mawson’s argument are admittedly sparse. What I present here is 
what I think Mawson is attempting to argue. As far as I can tell, Mawson’s 
knowledge argument can be stated as follows.  
 
K1) A being who infallibly knows the future free actions of creatures 
knows more than a being who does not infallibly know the future free 
actions of creatures.  
K2) A timeless God can infallibly know the future free actions of creatures.  
K3) A temporal God cannot infallibly know the future free actions of 
creatures.  
K4) Thus, a timeless God infallibly knows more than a temporal God.  
 
(K1) seems fairly uncontroversial, so I do not think it needs justification. (K4) 
follows straightforwardly from (K1) through (K3). All of the action seems to be 
taking place in (K2) and (K3). If Mawson can justify (K2) and (K3), he can claim 
a point in favour of divine timelessness. The timeless God knows the future free 
actions of creatures whereas the temporal God does not. Thus, the timeless God 
 
17 Mawson (2018, 217). 
18 Mawson (2018, 47). 
19 Mawson (2018, 50). 
20 Mawson (2018, 47). 




has intensive superiority with regards to knowledge. How does Mawson justify 
these premises?  
The details in Mawson’s account are sparse. To start, Mawson asserts that 
temporalists affirm presentism, and atemporalists affirm eternalism. This is a 
useful pedagogical device for Mawson’s book, but as Mawson himself would 
concede, there are other options. On presentism, only the present moment of time 
exists. On eternalism, all moments of time exist in before and after relations.21 As 
Mawson sees it, the timeless God is able to see all of time at once in a timeless 
moment. Thus, giving the timeless God infallible knowledge of the future, hence 
the acceptance of (K2). The version of divine temporality that Mawson focuses 
on is called open theism. Open theists deny that God knows the future, thus 
accepting (K3).  
Mawson alludes to further justification for (K2). He argues that if a temporal 
God knows the future with infallible omniscience, then creatures cannot be free.22 
As Mawson understands freedom, a person is free only if she is the source of her 
action, and has the ability to do otherwise.23 If God knows that you will perform 
action A tomorrow, then you cannot fail to perform action A. Thus, you will not 
have the ability to do otherwise.  
However, Mawson does not make it clear why this is a unique problem for 
divine temporality, nor does he explain exactly how timelessness helps.24 As is 
well known, the freedom/foreknowledge problem can be easily reformulated to 
fit God’s timeless knowledge.25 
As it stands, it is not entirely clear how to justify (K2) and (K3). In section 4, I 
shall develop some of the conceptual machinery that is needed to clarify 
Mawson’s argument. Then, in section 5, I shall use this conceptual machinery to 





21 I shall limit myself to presentist and eternalist ontologies of time. There are other ontologies 
of time, but space does not permit a discussion of views such as the growing block, the moving 
spotlight, branching time, hypertime, and fragmentalism.  
22 Mawson (2018, 36). 
23 Mawson’s comments on free will in Mawson (2018) are quite limited. For a full discussion 
of his view on free will see Mawson (2011). 
24 I am guessing that Mawson is affirming a view called the simple foreknowledge view. For 
a recent detailed defence of this view, see K. A. Rogers (2019). However, I say that Mawson ought 
not to affirm the simple foreknowledge view because it is providentially useless, and thus 
undermines his divine bodgery argument against divine temporality. Cf. Hasker (2009). 
25 Vicens and Kittle (2019, 23–24), Helm (2001, 187). However, Florio and Frigerio (2019) offer 
a recent defence of timelessness and foreknowledge by employing an ontology of time called 
fragmentalism. Discussing this ontology of time is beyond the scope of this paper.  




3.2. The Divine Bodgery Argument 
 
Mawson’s divine bodgery argument has more details than his knowledge 
argument. However, it seems to rest on the success of the knowledge argument. 
The divine bodgery argument has to do with God’s knowledge of the future, and 
God’s ability to providentially bring about what God wants. Mawson argues that 
a God without exhaustive foreknowledge could make mistakes, and really bodge 
things up. One bodges an action when (i) one performs an action with the 
intention of bringing about certain results, and (ii) those results do not come 
about.26  
According to Mawson, a God who bodges things up is not as powerful as a 
God who could not possibly bodge things up. The advantage is meant to go to 
divine timelessness because of the alleged increase in knowledge that 
timelessness is meant to give. Again, according to Mawson, divine timelessness 
affirms eternalism. Thus, God knows what happens in the future, and thus 
apparently cannot bodge things up. According to Mawson, things are different 
for the divine temporalist. Recall that Mawson assumes the temporalist is going 
to be an open theist who denies that God knows the future. If a temporalist denies 
that God infallibly knows the future, then God cannot be certain what the 
outcome will be for His actions. Thus, it is possible that the temporal God bodge 
things up because He does not know for certain that His actions will bring about 
their intended effects.  
According to Mawson, this not only makes the temporal God less powerful, it 
also makes the temporal God less good. A God who bodges things up is not as 
good as a God who could not possibly bodge things up. Recall that Mawson says 
that a perfectly good God is good in 3 ways: virtue, deontology, and 
consequences. The issue of bodging is not obviously an attack on the temporal 
God’s goodness along virtue or deontological lines. The problem of divine 
bodging is about God’s consequential goodness because the temporal God 
cannot ensure that His actions will bring about their intended effects.  
According to Mawson, the timeless God eternally decrees and knows all that 
He decrees and knows. God’s particular intentions that certain things take place 
at specific times is included in God’s eternal decree.27 This, according to Mawson, 
is not something that a temporal God can consistently do. Again, this is because 
Mawson assumes that the best temporalist position is open theism. Again, on 
open theism, God cannot know which future events will in fact occur. Thus, God 
cannot eternally decree His own particular intentional actions. This opens up the 
possibility for divine bodging.  
 
26 Mawson (2018, 41). 
27 Mawson (2018, 32). 




Perhaps Mawson’s divine bodgery argument can be stated like this.  
 
B1) A being who cannot bodge things up is more powerful and good than 
a being who can bodge things up.  
B2) If God does not infallibly know the future, then God can bodge things 
up. 
B3) If God does infallibly know the future, then God cannot bodge things 
up.  
B4) A timeless God infallibly knows the future. 
B5) Thus, a timeless God cannot bodge things up.  
B6) A temporal God cannot infallibly know the future.  
B7) Thus, a temporal God can bodge things up.  
B8) Thus, the timeless God is more powerful and good than the temporal 
God.  
 
3.3. Initial Reactions to Mawson’s Arguments 
 
In what follows, I wish to briefly explore several options for responding to 
Mawson’s arguments. In so doing, I shall demonstrate that divine timelessness is 
not doing any work to establish that God has more knowledge, power, and 
goodness. Thus, nothing about timelessness obviously makes God intensively 
superior to a temporal God. To be sure, each option for responding to the 
arguments comes with a cost, but as I shall point out, the costs have nothing to 
with whether God is timeless or temporal.  
In the next section, I shall lay out some of the conceptual machinery needed to 
develop the options that are open to the temporalist. Then I shall discuss three 
ways that a temporalist might reject premise (K3) of Mawson’s knowledge 
argument, and (B6) of the divine bodgery argument. I will also explore one way 
for the temporalist to reject premise (K2) of the knowledge argument, and (B2) of 
the divine bodgery argument.  
 
4. The Five Fold Openness of the Future 
 
In a series of articles, Alan Rhoda has articulated five different senses in which 
the future may be considered as open or closed: ontically, causally, alethically, 
epistemically, and providentially.28  
I will start with the future being ontically open. According to Rhoda, “The 
future is ontically open as of time t if and only if no unique, complete sequence 
 
28 Rhoda (2011, 2013). 




of events which are future relative to t exists simpliciter.”29 There are at least two 
ontologies of time that have an ontically open future. These are presentism and 
the growing block. An eternalist ontology would have an ontically closed or 
settled future in that there exists a unique set of events that are future relative to 
some time t.  
If the future is ontically open, one might wonder about the truth–values of 
propositions about the future. This leads to the next issue—alethic openness.30 
Do propositions about the future have a determinate truth–value of true or false? 
If the future is alethically open, the answer is no. If the future is alethically closed 
or settled, the answer is yes.  
How does one get an alethically settled future if the future is ontically open? 
There are several options. There might simply exist true propositions about the 
future. Or prior conditions might determine the truth–values of future–tensed 
propositions. If these prior conditions determine the truth–values of future–
tensed propositions, then the future is not causally open. According to Rhoda, 
“The future is causally open if and only if there is more than one causally possible 
future.”31 
As I shall discuss below, theological determinists affirm that the future is 
causally closed, or settled, in that God has causally determined how the entire 
timeline shall unfold. If God causally determines the entire future, then it is easy 
to see how God could know how the entire future will unfold. Other theologians 
will deny that God causally determines how the entire future will unfold, but 
will still maintain that God knows the truth–values of the future–tensed 
propositions. Hence, both of these groups of theologians agree that the future is 
epistemically closed because it is known which possible future will in fact come 
to pass. As an open theist, Rhoda is committed to the future being epistemically 
open in that no one, not even God, knows exactly how the future will unfold.32  
If the future is epistemically settled for God, then one can say that the future 
is providentially settled because God knows that He has acted in a way that 
guarantees that a unique causally possible future will come to pass. This is often 
stated as God ordaining or decreeing that a particular timeline shall occur. 
According to Rhoda, the future is providentially open if and only if God has not 
ordained or decreed how the entire future will unfold.33  
Theists like Mawson affirm that the future is settled or closed in all five ways, 
whereas open theists like Rhoda will affirm that the future is open in all five 
ways. However, there are other options.   
 
29 Rhoda (2013, 293). 
30 Rhoda (2013, 293). 
31 Rhoda (2013, 289). 
32 Rhoda (2013, 290). 
33 Rhoda (2013, 291). 




5. Temporalist Responses to Mawson’s Arguments 
 
With these 5 different understandings of how the future is open or closed, I can 
articulate different ways for the temporalist to respond to Mawson’s argument. 
In each case, I will show that Mawson’s argument fails to show that divine 
timelessness provides God with more knowledge or providential control. I begin 
with the earliest view of omniscience in the Western tradition, and then proceed 
to consider views that develop later in history.  
 
5.1. Option 1: The Traditional Story of Omniscience 
 
There is one question that Mawson does not explicitly address that is crucial for 
any debate about omniscience. This is called the Source Question.34 How does 
God know the truth–values of all propositions? There are several ways that one 
might answer it. Here is one way to answer this question.   
 
Divine Self–Knowledge: God has a perfect introspective knowledge of 
Himself, and thus knows all things. God’s knowledge is in no way 
dependent upon what happens in time.  
 
This view goes back at least to Aristotle, though Aristotle says that God’s 
knowledge is only of necessary truths. For Aristotle, God is completely unaware 
of any contingent truths, like what is happening in the universe or what will 
happen in the future.35 Early Christian thinkers attempted to build knowledge of 
contingent truths into God’s self–knowledge. This view can be found in thinkers 
like the early Augustine before he developed his doctrine of predestination.36 On 
this view, it seems like God just gets the knowledge for free. Something about 
God’s essence just entails that there are truth–values for all propositions, and that 
God automatically knows these propositions. For example, God’s essence just 
entails the truth of the proposition <Sally sits on Arthur’s Seat at 12 April, 2025>. 
If an atemporalist like Augustine can affirm this view, I see no reason why a 
temporalist cannot affirm this view. The temporalist can say that God has a 
perfect introspective knowledge of Himself, and thus knows all things. Whether 
or not God is timeless or temporal is really irrelevant. A temporal God can have 
a perfect introspective knowledge of Himself. If that is all it takes to know the 
 
34 Anfray (2014, 335). 
35 Florio and Frigerio (2019, 71). 
36 Augustine, The Trinity XV.13.22. Charnock (1864, 464ff). Though it should be said that 
Stephen Charnock elsewhere affirms that God’s knowledge causes all things (1864, 386). The 
claim that God’s knowledge causes all things is fairly common within the classical tradition. Cf. 
Rogers (2019). 




future, then a temporal God can know the future. Timelessness is not doing any 
work here to increase God’s knowledge. All the work is being done by God’s 
self–knowledge. Thus, the temporalist can reject premise (K3) of Mawson’s 
knowledge argument. Again, that premise says that the temporal God cannot 
infallibly know the future free actions of creatures.  
One might push back and say that the temporal God cannot know this without 
undermining creaturely freedom. Yet, notice that nothing about God existing 
with or without succession changes the truth–value of the proposition <Sally sits 
on Arthur’s Seat at 12 April, 2025>. On the self–knowledge version of 
omniscience, God’s essence just somehow entails the truth of this proposition. It 
is the essence of God that alethically settles the future. It is through God’s self–
knowledge of His own essence that the future is epistemically settled.  
If anything is a problem for creaturely freedom, it will not be God’s 
knowledge, but rather His essence. God’s timelessness is not doing anything here 
to resolve any tensions between freedom and foreknowledge. It doesn’t matter if 
God’s knowledge of this proposition is timeless or temporal because the truth–
value remains the same, and the truth–value is determined by God’s essence. 
Thus, if one adopts the self–knowledge version of omniscience, one will not be 
able to spot any obvious advantage for timelessness over temporality with 
regards to knowledge of what creatures will freely do in the future.  
What about divine goodness and power? Say the divine temporalist accepts 
the self–knowledge account of omniscience. She can reject premise (B6) of the 
divine bodgery argument which says that the temporal God does not infallibly 
know the future. Thus, avoiding the conclusion that the temporal God is capable 
of bodging up history, and thus avoiding the conclusion that the temporal God 
has less power and goodness than the timeless God.  
However, certain questions arise at this point. How does this self–knowledge 
work? God’s self–knowledge seems to be related to the doctrine of the divine 
ideas.37 The doctrine of divine ideas starts by pointing out that God is the source 
of all of the great–making properties. As the source of the great–making 
properties, creatures can only instantiate properties like power or knowledge by 
participating in God’s power and knowledge. The doctrine of the divine ideas 
states that through a perfect self–knowledge of His own divine essence, God 
knows all of the ways that created beings could participate in His essence. 
As interesting as the divine ideas doctrine is, there is pushback against this 
view, even from within the tradition of divine timelessness. Within the classical 
Christian tradition, theologians began to notice that God’s self–knowledge only 
gives God knowledge of all necessarily true propositions, and propositions about 
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what is possible.38 The problem that these theologians wished to address is how 
God is able to know which contingent propositions are true. For example, how 
does God know that one particular future will occur instead of a different future?  
This is a question that a proponent of timelessness and temporality will both 
need to address. If the self–knowledge view does not give God knowledge that 
one particular future will occur, this is a problem for everyone who wishes to 
affirm God’s knowledge of the future.  
  
5.2. Option 2: Theological Determinism 
 
How does God know the future? One major line of thought in the classical 
tradition offered an answer to this question by appealing to God’s act, will, or 
decree. On this view, God knows the future because God has a perfect knowledge 
of the cause of the future—i.e. His act or decree to create a universe with a specific 
timeline. Theologians who affirm this solution say that God knows which future 
timeline will occur because God knows that He has causally determined which 
particular timeline will occur. Call this view theological determinism.  
According to Derk Pereboom, “Theological determinism is the position that 
God is the sufficient active cause of everything in creation, whether directly or 
by way of secondary causes such as human agents.”39 Theological determinists 
say that God is the primary cause of everything, whereas created things are 
secondary causes. To say that God directly brings about something is to say that 
God causes a particular state of affairs to obtain without any secondary causes. 
God indirectly brings something about by causing creatures to causally bring 
about a particular state of affairs.40 Theological determinists typically, though not 
always, affirm compatibilism which says that human freedom is compatible with 
divine determinism.  
There are several ways to tell the theological determinist story.41 I will argue 
that in each case, divine timelessness is doing no work in contributing to God’s 
knowledge nor providential governing of the universe. As such, a timeless God 
is not intensively superior to the temporal God.  
Earlier I noted the 5 fold way that the future is open or closed. A theological 
determinist has some wiggle room here with how to develop her theological 
system, but she does have several commitments. All versions of theological 
determinism are committed to the future being alethically, providentially, 
epistemically, and causally settled.42 This is because theological determinism says 
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that God cannot know the future unless He determines the truth–values of 
propositions about the future.43  
 
Theological Determinist Story: Prior to the act of creation, God knows all 
the possible universes and exhaustive timelines that He could create via 
His natural knowledge. God’s act of creation, or decree to create, refers to 
God determining that a particular universe and timeline come to exist. In 
selecting to create a universe and timeline, God exhaustively determines 
the truth–values of the propositions about that universe and timeline, thus 
the future is alethically settled. This decree to create also providentially 
and causally settles the future. Subsequent to God’s decree, God knows 
the truth–values of the propositions about that universe and timeline via 
His free knowledge. Thus, the future is also epistemically settled.  
 
This story needs a bit of unpacking because this theological determinist story 
can be told on both divine timelessness and divine temporality. To start, I take a 
universe to be a particular collection of contingent, spatio–temporally related 
objects. I understand a timeline to be a particular ordering of a series of temporal 
moments. A temporal moment of time is a way things are but could be 
subsequently otherwise. 
The theological determinist often distinguishes between God’s natural 
knowledge and God’s free knowledge. She says that God’s natural knowledge gives 
God knowledge of all possible universes and exhaustive timelines that He could 
create. This knowledge is prior to God’s free knowledge, which is knowledge of 
which timeline God has freely determined to bring about. On this view, until God 
freely decides to create a particular universe with a particular timeline, there 
simply is no fact of the matter as to which possible timeline will become actual.44 
In other words, the future is alethically, epistemically, providentially, ontically, 
and causally open until God decrees that a particular future be actualized. 
Subsequent to God’s decree to create a particular timeline, God knows what will 
occur because He knows which timeline He has freely determined to bring about. 
The decree is the foundation of God’s free knowledge.45 
All of this talk about “prior” and “subsequent” sounds deeply temporal. 
However, the “prior” in the story could be a “logically prior” in the case of divine 
timelessness, or it could be a “temporally prior” in the case of divine temporality. 
The advocate of divine timelessness, Paul Helm, explains that the classical 
tradition developed the notion of “logical moments” in the timeless life of God 
in order to solve various theological puzzles. These logical moments function like 
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temporal moments in that they stand in some kind of order of priority and 
posteriority to one another. Theological determinists who affirm timelessness are 
split over exactly how many logical moments there are in the timeless life of 
God.46 However, they agree that these logical moments are not temporal, so there 
is no temporal succession in the life of the timeless God.47  
I have my doubts about the coherency of these logical moments, but I can grant 
their coherency for the sake of argument. If logical moments are coherent, then 
the proponent of divine timelessness can give a reading of the theological 
determinist story that is consistent with her view. But the divine temporalist can 
also give a reading of the theological determinist story that is consistent with her 
view in terms of temporal moments. Thus, there is no obvious advantage to be 
gained by affirming divine timelessness.  
There is a way to nuance the theological determinist story in order to further 
drive home the point that divine timelessness is not doing any work. The 
theological determinist story can be told on different conceptions of the ontic 
openness of the future. Mawson’s argument assumes that a proponent of divine 
temporality will affirm a presentist ontology of time, but the temporalist need 
not affirm presentism. A theological determinist who affirms divine temporality 
can believe in presentism. She will say that the future is alethically, 
providentially, epistemically, and causally settled, but that the future is ontically 
open. However, a temporalist can easily affirm eternalism.48 If she affirms 
eternalism, she will say that the future is ontically, alethically, providentially, 
epistemically, and causally settled. This five–fold settledness of the future looks 
exactly like Mawson’s account of the timeless God’s relationship to the world. 
Hence, it should be clear that timelessness is not doing any work since a 
temporalist can also affirm the five–fold settledness of the future.  
Since the theological determinist story can be told on divine temporality, the 
divine temporalist has an easy way out of Mawson’s knowledge argument. She 
can reject premise (K3) in Mawson’s knowledge argument. Again, premise (K3) 
states that if God is temporal, then God cannot know the future free actions of 
creatures. The theological determinist says that “free” in premise (K3) should be 
understood according to compatibilism. She affirms that the temporal God 
knows what His creatures will freely do in the future.  
Mawson will push back at this point. He rejects theological determinism 
because he thinks that it offers an unattractive view of human freedom, yet 
concedes that it is an option for a theist to affirm.49 So long as it is an option, the 
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temporalist can accept determinism in order to avoid Mawson’s knowledge 
argument. Moreover, one will recall that Mawson defines freedom as having it 
within one’s power to do other than what one in fact does.50 Theological 
determinists are typically quite happy to affirm that a human person could have 
acted differently, but that it is certain that they will act as God has decreed.51 
Whether or not the theological determinist can consistently affirm this view is a 
topic for another day. Also, it is unclear if Mawson can consistently maintain that 
free creatures have the ability to do otherwise since he affirms that the future is 
closed in all five ways.52 For the purposes of this paper, I maintain that theological 
determinism is one option for avoiding Mawson’s knowledge argument.  
The temporalist who affirms theological determinism can also avoid the 
conclusion of Mawson’s divine bodgery argument. The theological determinist 
rejects premise (B6), which says that a temporal God cannot infallibly know the 
future. A theological determinist says that God does know the future because He 
determined it. Hence, she can easily affirm that it is impossible for God to bodge 
things up. Thus, there is no loss to God’s knowledge, power, and goodness to be 
had by denying divine timelessness.  
 
5.3. Option 3: Molinism 
 
Not every theologian is happy with theological determinism. If one accepts 
libertarian freedom, she will be rejecting the determinist’s compatibilist 
understanding of freedom. Theologians who affirm libertarian freedom tend to 
affirm one of two views on providence: either Molinism or open theism. Both 
Molinism and open theism will say that God has a perfect knowledge of Himself, 
and thus knows all that is necessarily true, and all that is possible. In other words, 
both are happy to accept God’s natural knowledge.  
Molinists and open theists are also happy to say that God has a perfect 
knowledge of whatever God determines to bring about. However, both will say 
that God does not determine everything. From here, disagreement arises 
between Molinists and open theists.  
Molinists claim that God has something called middle knowledge. The 
Molinist says that middle knowledge is distinct from God’s natural and free 
knowledge. The content of God’s middle knowledge is said to be God’s 
prevolitional knowledge of conditional future contingent propositions about 
what creatures would freely do in any possible circumstance that they might be 
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placed in. The Molinist says that God is not the cause of creaturely actions. In 
other words, God does not determine the truth–values of these particular 
propositions about what creatures would do, thus allegedly avoiding divine 
determinism. God’s middle knowledge is said to be subsequent to His natural 
knowledge, but prior to His free knowledge. Molinists claim that God uses this 
knowledge to narrow down the range of feasible timelines that He knows via His 
natural knowledge. God then selects a possible timeline from the set of feasible 
timelines. Subsequent to God’s free choice of a timeline, God knows what He has 
freely decreed to bring about.53  
 
Molinist Story: Prior to the act of creation, God knows all the possible 
universes and exhaustive timelines that He could create via His natural 
knowledge. Subsequently, God knows via His middle knowledge what 
creatures would freely do in any possible circumstance. Subsequently, 
God’s act of creation, or decree to create, refers to God willing that a 
particular universe and timeline come to exist. In selecting to create a 
universe and timeline, God determines the truth–values of the 
propositions about which universe and timeline will be actual. 
Subsequently, God has free knowledge of which universe and timeline 
that He has willed to create. Thus the future is alethically, epistemically, 
and providentially settled.  
  
As with the determinist story, the Molinist story can be told on divine 
timelessness and divine temporality. The proponent of divine timelessness will 
refer to all of these moments as logical moments.54 A proponent of divine 
temporality can refer to these as temporal moments. Alternatively, she could 
refer to some of them as logical moments, and others as temporal moments.  
As with theological determinism, one can nuance the Molinist story by adding 
in a temporal ontology. Yet, the results are not quite so obvious to me. A Molinist, 
like William Lane Craig, will affirm a presentist ontology of time along with 
divine temporality.55 Someone like Craig will affirm that the future is alethically, 
epistemically, and providentially settled, yet causally and ontically open. It is 
conceivable that a temporalist and Molinist affirm an eternalist ontology of time, 
yet it is unclear to me what advantages this view has.56 On this view, the future 
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would be alethically, epistemically, providentially, causally, and ontically 
settled. My worry is that this combination of views is indistinguishable from 
theological determinism because it agrees to the five–fold settledness of the 
future. To be sure, the Molinist will say that creatures are offering their own 
causal contributions to history, but the determinist says the same thing. I’ll leave 
this particular problem aside because exploring it would derail the conversation. 
Instead, I will assume a Molinist view like Craig’s is the best option for the 
temporalist.  
Since the Molinist story can be told on timelessness or temporality, there is no 
advantage for divine timelessness here with respect to God’s knowledge. Thus, 
the divine temporalist can affirm Molinism, and reject premise (K3) of Mawson’s 
knowledge argument. She also rejects premise (B6) of the divine bodgery 
argument. Hence, a temporalist who is a Molinist can say that there is no loss to 
God’s knowledge, power, and goodness by rejecting divine timelessness.  
Will someone like Mawson find Molinism to be a satisfactory option for 
avoiding his argument? In a footnote, Mawson rules out Molinism as an option 
for divine knowledge and providence, but he doesn’t say why.57 However, it is 
easy to guess Mawson’s reason because there are serious objections to Molinism. 
However, that debate is ongoing, so the temporalist can arguably affirm 
Molinism in order to avoid Mawson’s objections to divine temporality.58  
 
5.4. Option 4: Open Theism  
 
Not every theist is happy with Molinism. The open theist and theological 
determinist both argue that middle knowledge is incoherent or impossible. Both 
also agree that it is impossible for God to foreknow what creatures with 
libertarian freedom will in fact do in the future.59 The open theist parts ways with 
the determinist here. The theological determinist denies libertarian freedom for 
creatures by affirming that God causally determines the future. The open theist 
denies that God causally determines the future free actions of creatures, and 
affirms libertarian freedom. As stated before, the open theist is committed to the 
five–fold openness of the future with regards to the actions of creatures. There 
are other aspects of the future that might be determined, such as divine 
prophecies or naturally reoccurring events like the rising of the sun, and God is 
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thus able to know those.60 But by and large, much of the future is open with 
regards to creaturely freedom.  
Given the five–fold openness of the future, the open theist rejects premise (K2) 
of Mawson’s knowledge argument. Since the future is ontically, providentially, 
causally, and alethically open, the future is also epistemically open because there 
simply is nothing more to know about the future other than those small portions 
of the future that the open theist says are already determined. In other words, 
given the openness of the future, it is metaphysically impossible for there to be 
more for God to know. Even a timeless God could not infallibly know the future 
in exhaustive detail because there is nothing for God to know. Thus, the open 
theist maintains that her model of God is not intensively inferior to the timeless 
God with regards to knowledge.  
Mawson has anticipated this sort of reply. This is why he offers his divine 
bodgery argument to establish that the open theist God is less powerful and good 
than a timeless God. The open theist, however, has a story to tell that she thinks 
avoids God having less power and goodness than is metaphysically possible.  
 
Open Theist Story: Prior to the act of creation, God knows all the possible 
universes and exhaustive timelines that He could create via His natural 
knowledge. Given God’s commitment to creating a universe that contains 
beings with libertarian freedom, it is impossible to know what those 
creatures will in fact freely do in the future. Hence, there is no exhaustive 
timeline for these universes. Yet, God knows all of the possible actions that 
His creatures might perform in any possible circumstance within the 
universe. Prior to the act of creation, God develops an exhaustive 
contingency plan for every possible future free action in order to 
guarantee that He achieves His ultimate goal for creation.61 Subsequently, 
God’s act of creation, or decree to create, refers to God willing that a 
particular universe come to exist. It does not refer to God willing that a 
particular timeline should come about. Instead, God’s decree to create 
contains a stated goal for the future history of the universe that God 
intends to providentially bring about in cooperation with His free 
creatures.  
 
Theological determinists find the open theist story to be in conflict with divine 
sovereignty, and thus reject libertarian freedom. But open theists claim that their 
view is not in conflict with divine sovereignty. This reveals a different strategy 
with regards to Mawson’s divine bodgery argument. The theological determinist 
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and the Molinist reject premise (B6), which says that the temporal God does not 
know the future. The open theist, however, accepts premise (B6) given her 
commitment to the five–fold openness of the future. Thus, the open theist needs 
to reject a different premise in the divine bodgery argument.  
The open theist has several different premises that she can reject. For example, 
an open theist like William Hasker will reject (B3) and (B4) as too simplistic. (B3) 
says that if God knows the future, then God cannot bodge things up. (B4) says 
that a timeless God knows the future. Hasker says that merely timelessly 
knowing the future does not give God any providential control.62 For example, 
God could merely timelessly know that He is going to bodge things up. In order 
to get providential control, Hasker says that timelessness will need to be 
supplemented by either theological determinism or Molinism.63 I have already 
argued that theological determinism and Molinism can be affirmed by divine 
temporalists. Thus, timelessness is not doing any work here to prevent divine 
bodgery.  
Furthermore, given the open theist’s commitment to the five–fold openness of 
the future, she will reject (B4), which is the claim that the timeless God knows the 
future. The open theist says that it is impossible for God to know the future 
regardless of whether God is timeless or temporal. Since the divine bodgery 
argument hinges on God’s knowledge of the future, the open theist might say the 
bodgery argument is a non–starter. Alternatively, she might say that if divine 
bodgery is a problem, it is a problem for everyone given the five–fold openness 
of the future.  
Ultimately, however, the open theist ought to insist that divine bodgery is not 
a problem. She ought to reject (B2), which says that if God does not know the 
future, then God can bodge things up. How can the open theist do this?  
To start, recall the definition of bodging. One bodges an action when (i) one 
performs an action with the intention of bringing about certain results, and (ii) 
those results do not come about. Does the God of open theism bodge? To be fair 
to Mawson, open theists seem to admit that something like divine bodgery could 
take place.64 Sometimes open theists play up just how risky it is for God to create 
a universe. For example, John Sanders classic book on open theism is called The 
God Who Risks.65 It might seem pretty obvious that a God who risks could possibly 
bodge things up. However, the possibility of divine bodgery depends on what 
God’s intentions are for creation and the possibility of God not getting that result. 
As Sanders points out, if God does not get everything He wants from the 
universe, then that is because God intended to create the sort of universe where 
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He cannot guarantee that He will get everything that He desires.66 An open theist 
like Sanders can say that this is not a straightforward bodge because God 
intended to create a universe with free creatures where the future is uncertain, 
and that is exactly what God ended up with. The fact that God intended for this 
result, and did in fact achieve this result, demonstrates that there is no divine 
bodgery.  
Perhaps Mawson could push back. Mawson could grant that, with regards to 
God’s act of creation, there is no bodgery. The God of open theism intended to 
create a universe with free creatures and an uncertain future. The God of open 
theism can clearly perform that action without bodging. Yet, Mawson can point 
out that open theists don’t think that God’s only goal for creation is to create a 
universe with free creatures and an uncertain future. Open theists typically have 
more built into God’s goal for creation. For example, open theists like Gregory 
Boyd typically say that a major reason God creates a universe with free creatures 
and an uncertain future is so that God can create a universe where genuine 
divine–human love is not only possible, but will eventually become actual.67 A 
major divine goal in creating the universe is for God to actually enter into genuine 
loving relationships with as many creatures as possible. Call this Major Divine 
Goal. 
 
MDG: One of God’s major goals for creation is to enter into genuine loving 
relationships with as many creatures as possible.  
 
Someone like Mawson could argue that it is possible for God to bodge up 
MDG. Mawson can say that God intends to establish loving relationships with 
His creatures, and that God fails to achieve these relationships in at least some 
cases. Thus, bodging things up.68  
How can the open theist respond? Open theists typically distinguish between 
meticulous providence and general providence.69 Open theists insist that they 
affirm general providence, whereas theological determinists and Molinists affirm 
a meticulous providence. On meticulous providence, God has an exhaustive 
control over each specific situation. Whatever God intends to bring about for each 
specific situation will certainly be achieved. God adopts specific–benefit policies 
for governing the world which would state that every divine act at each moment 
should achieve a very particular benefit. For example, every instance of evil 
should be for the purpose of building souls.70  
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Things are allegedly different on a general providence where God sets up the 
general structures of the universe in order to allow free creatures to have 
meaningful input in how history unfolds. On general providence, God adopts 
general–policies for governing the world. God does not have a specific intention 
for each and every event that takes place in the universe.71 For example, in order 
to make it possible for creatures to enter into loving relationships with God, God 
has to create and sustain a fine–tuned universe with law–like regularities. In 
many instances of evil that occur in the world, the open theist says that God could 
unilaterally intervene to prevent the evil. Yet, the open theist says that in most 
cases God will not intervene because God is employing a general–policy to 
maintain the law–like regularities. God’s general policy of maintaining these 
law–like regularities promotes the MDG because it continues to make possible 
creaturely freedom.  
It might seem that the open theist’s general providence is a promising way to 
avoid divine bodgery. This is because God allegedly does not have specific 
results that He intends to achieve for each individual action that He performs 
other than the general–policies He has adopted in order to achieve the MDG. To 
see this, recall that the open theist can point out that MDG does not entail a 
specific result like universal salvation. MDG only says that one of God’s major 
goals is to enter into genuine loving relationships with as many creatures as 
possible, which could fall short of universalism. Universalism is a contentious 
issue among open theists, and space does not permit me to enter into that 
debate.72 What I can say is that the open theist can claim that God set out to 
achieve a general goal of entering into loving relationships with as many 
creatures as possible, and He adopts general–policies to help Him achieve that 
goal. The open theist can say that if God had a more specific goal in mind, like 
universal salvation or the salvation of exactly 144,000 people, then it might be 
that God could bodge things up. But in God’s unsurpassable wisdom, God 
selected the more general goal of MDG, which avoids any threat of divine 
bodgery.    
Yet divine bodgery might be avoided in another way that the average open 
theist will not expect. On the strongest versions of open theism, God has His 
overarching goal for creation, and He has an exhaustive contingency plan set in 
motion in order to achieve the MDG. The analogy sometimes given by open 
theists is that God is like a master chess player who knows that He will win the 
game prior to starting the game. God knows all the possible moves that His 
creatures could make, and He has an exhaustive plan put in place in order to win. 
God does not know in fact how the game will unfold, but He knows for certain 
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that He will win before He begins playing.73 What an open theist like this can say 
is that prior to the act of creating the universe, God intends to achieve the MDG 
by means of His exhaustive contingency plan, and He knows for certain that He 
will achieve His goal on the basis of His exhaustive contingency plan. For 
example, Boyd maintains that God’s contingency plan involves eliminating 
possible timelines where the MDG fails.74 Hence, when God performs His act of 
creating the universe, He intends to bring about a particular goal, and He knows 
for certain that the results will eventually come about. He just doesn’t know 
exactly how the results will come about. That doesn’t look like divine bodgery in 
any objectionable way, though Mawson will demur.75 In fact, God’s plan has built 
into it the elimination of potential bodgery from the start.  
For Boyd, the contingency plans are built into God’s original intention, and 
those contingency plans eliminate potential divine bodgery before God creates 
the universe. Recall that one bodges an action when (i) one performs an action 
with the intention of bringing about certain results, and (ii) those results do not 
come about. Boyd can say that no divine bodge has taken place since God intends 
to rely on His contingency plans, and He does in fact rely on His contingency 
plans as a result.  
Of course, someone might wonder how God’s contingency plan can eliminate 
bodgery from the start and still be considered a theory of general providence. 
Recall that open theists claim that they affirm a general providence whereas 
theological determinists and Molinists affirm a meticulous providence. This 
assertion, however, has been called into question in recent literature, with 
various philosophers arguing that Molinists can affirm a general providence, and 
that open theists can affirm a meticulous providence.76 For example, Greg Welty 
has recently argued that the open theist’s general providence looks remarkably 
like meticulous providence.77 This is because each divine action is ultimately 
geared towards furthering His overarching goal for creation. Each individual 
divine act is intended to further God’s goal. Since (i) God knows all of the possible 
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outcomes of His individual acts, (ii) all of the probabilities of each act furthering 
His goals, and (iii) has an exhaustive contingency plan for each course of action, 
thus God will always be able to select a course of action that furthers His ultimate 
goal for creation. What this means is that the God of open theism is constantly 
selecting actions that furthers His goals, which looks remarkably meticulous.  
To be sure, many prominent open theists will not like having a meticulous 
account of providence.78 In my view, the divine temporalist should not be put off 
by having a meticulous open theist account of providence. Instead, she should 





According to Keith Ward, divine timelessness gives the illusion of power over 
the future. Ward maintains that omnipotence is the only thing needed for God to 
have power over the future.79 In his estimation, timelessness is not doing any 
work in this regard. I believe that I have offered several reasons to support this 
conclusion as it pertains to Mawson’s knowledge argument and bodgery 
argument. I have articulated several ways for a divine temporalist to respond to 
Mawson’s arguments, and have attempted to show that timelessness does not 
give God any advantage in terms of power, goodness, or knowledge. Each view 
that I have discussed does come with various costs, but I maintain that those costs 
do not effect the debate over whether or not God is timeless or temporal. More 
work does need to be done on comparing rival models of God, and I hope that I 
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